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Abstract
This paper proposes an axiomatic analysis of Impact Factors when used as
tools for ranking journals. This analysis draws on the similarities between
the problem of comparing distribution of citations among papers and that of
comparing probability distributions on consequences as commonly done in
decision theory. Our analysis singles out a number of characteristic properties
of the ranking based on Impact Factors. We also suggest alternative ways of
using distributions of citations to rank order journals.
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1. Introduction
The traditional way to evaluate research is to rely on peer judgement.
Because this evaluation technique is costly and may suer from a number
of problems (Campanario 1998a,b), the bibliometric literature has developed
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1955, 1972, 1979). As noted by van Raan (2005, p. 2), this \unavoidably
introduces a bibliometrically limited view of a complex reality".
Among the numerous bibliometric indices that have been proposed in
the literature, Impact Factors (IFs) of journals stand out as being among
the oldest and the most widely used when it comes to evaluate journals
(recent references using IFs for ranking journals include Bar-Ilan 2010, and
Franceschet 2010). Gl anzel and Moed (2002, p. 172) describe IFs as \a funda-
mental citation-based measure for signicance and performance of scientic
journals". We refer the reader to Gl anzel and Moed (2002) for a thorough
overview on IFs. Archambault and Larivi ere (2009) and Gareld (2006) de-
tail the history and origins of IFs. Roughly speaking, the IF of a journal gives
the mean number of citations received by papers published in this journal.
IFs are not the only bibliometric indices that have been introduced in the
literature. Recent years have seen a ourishing of such indices, including,
e.g., the h-index (Hirsch 2005) and the g-index (Egghe 2006). These new
indices have almost immediately after their introduction been studied from
an axiomatic standpoint (Marchant 2009a,b, Quesada 2009, Rousseau 2008b,
Woeginger 2008a,b,c). Curiously, this axiomatic literature has not paid much
attention to IFs, although they are much older and more widely used.
An exception is Bouyssou and Marchant (2010) who studied the problem
of consistently ranking authors and journals. The study of consistent rank-
ings of authors and journals requires a rather rich framework that includes
three dierent sets (authors, papers, and journals) and three dierent binary
relations (indicating authorship, citations, and publication media). Within
this framework, we presented axioms implying that journals are ranked ac-
cording to IFs and authors according to the number of citations received by
the papers they have signed (with an eventual correction for co-authors).
This analysis uses many axioms because of the richness of the framework.
Furthermore, because axioms related to journals and axioms related to au-
thors are linked by a consistency condition, they interact. It is therefore
not easy to derive from the results in Bouyssou and Marchant (2010) what
are the conditions needed to characterize the ranking of journals using IFs,
independently of what happens with authors. This is the purpose of the
present paper. We will use a simple framework that only involves journals
and present a set of conditions implying that journals are ranked using IFs.
Our present treatment of the ranking of journals based on IFs rests on
a fairly simple intuition. In order to compute the IF of a journal, it is only
2necessary to know how many papers published in this journal have received
x citations, for all integer x 2 N, i.e., the distribution of citations for the
journal. Comparing distributions of citations bears a striking resemblance
with the problem of comparing probability distributions on consequences, a
classical problem in decision theory. Exploiting this similarity will allow us
to provide a simple axiomatic foundation to the ranking of journals based on
IFs. This will also lead us to suggest alternative rankings that use general-
izations of IFs. On the technical side, while Marchant (2009b) emphasizes
the power of results on \extensive measurement" (Krantz, Luce, Suppes,
and Tversky 1971) to deal with the ranking of authors, we will show that
results on \expected utility" (Fishburn 1970) are much relevant to analyze
the ranking of journals using IFs. We hope that this will shed a new light
on the discussion concerning the pros and cons of this bibliometric ranking
of journals by making explicit the conditions underlying it.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our framework
and notation. Section 3 presents the main conditions used in the paper. Sec-
tion 4 characterizes a class of bibliometric rankings of journals that includes
the one based on IFs as a particular case. Section 5 specializes this analysis
to characterize the ranking based on IFs. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A
illustrates some of our ndings using citation data for a small sample of
economic journals.
2. Notation and denitions
A published paper may receive citations from other papers. We take here
these citations as given and we do not discuss the various ways in which
such citations can or should be computed (e.g., what is the set of journals
that should be included in the database, what is the relevant time window
to collect citations, how should we deal with self-citations, etc.). The only
aspect of papers that is taken into account in our analysis is the number of
citations (possibly zero) that they receive.
We view a journal as a set of papers, consistently with the approach
used in Marchant (2009a,b) to deal with authors. For our purposes, we may
model a journal a as a function from N to N where, for all x 2 N, a(x) is
interpreted as the number of papers published in journal a having received
exactly x citations. Hence, we identify a journal with its distribution of
citations. We will restrict our attention to journals for which there are only
a nite number of y 2 N such that a(y) 6= 0. We dene the set of all journals
3J = fa;b;:::g as the set of all functions from N to N satisfying the above
constraint.
Using the above notation, it is clear that journal a 2 J has published a
number of papers given by
N(a) =
X
x2N
a(x):
The number of citations received by the papers published in journal a 2 J
is simply given by:
C(a) =
X
x2N
xa(x):
By denition, the Impact Factor IF(a) of journal a 2 J represents the
average number of citations received by the papers published in a, i.e.,
IF(a) =
C(a)
N(a)
=
P
x2N xa(x)
P
x2N a(x)
:
We will be concerned here with the ranking that is induced on the set J of
all journals by the values IF, i.e., the binary relation %IF dened letting, for
all a;b 2 J,
a %IF b , IF(a)  IF(b): (1)
Our main objective will be to characterize the relation %IF within the class
of all possible binary relations on J.
It may be useful to stress a number of important points about our frame-
work. Observe rst that the set of journals J includes innitely many jour-
nals since journals having all possible distributions of citations belong to J.
Such a rich set of journals J will allow us to keep the analysis simple (tech-
nically, we use here a \single prole" approach as in Marchant (2009a,b),
contrary to the \multi-prole" approach used in Bouyssou and Marchant
(2010)). Second, our framework is such that it makes sense to \add" two
journals or to \multiply" a journal by an integer. Indeed, if a;b 2 J, it is
clear that a+b 2 J and na 2 J, for all n 2 N (i.e., for all a;b 2 J and for all
n 2 N, there are c;d 2 J such that c(x) = a(x)+b(x) and d(x) = na(x), for
all x 2 N). Third, our framework is such that we will be unable to deal with
the important question of the eld normalization of IFs (Adler, Ewing, and
Taylor 2009, Zitt 2010). Let us nally note that this framework is inadequate
to analyze models in which the \weight" of a citation could depend on the
4citing paper, e.g., through the journal in which the citing paper is published,
as in Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004). A framework that would allow us
to deal with such models would be far more complex than the present one,
while not being much useful to understand the characteristic properties of
the relation %IF.
3. Axioms
Let % be a binary relation on the set J of all journals 1. We interpret %
as an \at least as good as" preference relation between journals (throughout
the paper, we use the term \preference" to indicate what some readers may
prefer to call \impact"). The relation  denotes the asymmetric part of %,
i.e., the binary relation on J such that a  b if [a % b and Not[b % a]]. We
interpret  as a \strict preference" relation between journals. The relation
 denotes the symmetric part of % (i.e., a  b if [a % b and b % a]) and is
interpreted as an \indierence" relation between journals.
We consider several conditions on a binary relation % on J.
Axiom 1 (Weak order). The binary relation % on J is a weak order, i.e., a
complete (for all a;b 2 J, a % b or b % a) and transitive (for all a;b;c 2 J,
[a % b and b % c] imply a % c) binary relation.
It is clear that the relation %IF dened by (1) is a weak order.
In decision theory, starting with a preference relation that is a weak order
is so classical that the above condition hardly needs an elaboration in this
context. The situation is more complex here since we are dealing with a
bibliometric comparison of journals. Basically, this condition states that we
want a model able to compare all journals in a consistent way. This is a
strong requirement. For instance, for rankings based on an index, one may
consider that small dierences in the value of the index should be neglected.
This leads to intransitive relations  and, hence, %. Similarly, Adler et al.
(2009) argue that a sensible evaluation of journals should use several indices.
This will clearly lead to incomplete relations if using several indices means
taking the intersection of the rankings induced by each of them.
Axiom 2 (Homogeneity). For all a 2 J and all n 2 N such that n > 0,
a  n  a.
1 i.e., a subset of J  J. As is usual, we will write a % b instead of (a;b) 2 %.
5It is clear that the relation %IF dened by (1) is homogeneous.
Homogeneity wishes to capture the initial motivation of Eugene Gareld
to create an index that would be size-independent (as explained, e.g., in
Gareld 2006) through the normalization of the numbers of citations received
by the size of the journal, measured by the number of papers it publishes.
Without such a condition, a journal might well try to modify its ranking by
asking authors to split all their papers into smaller units (e.g., requiring all
papers to have a \part 1" and a \part 2"). In our framework, a journal is
identied with its distribution of citations. When Homogeneity is admitted,
two journals having the same distribution of relative frequencies of citations
will be indierent.
Axiom 3 (Independence). For all a;b;c 2 J such that N(a) = N(b) = N(c),
a  b ) a + c  b + c;
a  b ) a + c  b + c:
It is easy to check that the above condition is satised by the relation
%IF dened by (1). Indeed, since N(a) = N(c), we have
IF(a + c) =
C(a) + C(c)
N(a) + N(c)
=
C(a) + C(c)
2N(a)
=
1
2
IF(a) +
1
2
IF(c):
This condition says that the comparison of two journals of equal size
(in terms of the number of papers that they publish) is not aected if each
of them merges with the same journal having the same size. Intuitively, it
is hard to imagine situations in which this condition would be undesirable.
Nevertheless, this condition is far from being innocuous. For instance journal
a may have no uncited papers, which may be the initial reason for stating
that a % b in spite of the fact that b contains many highly cited papers.
After the merger with c, the journal a + c, can have many uncited papers,
which may clearly aect its comparison with b + c. The importance of this
condition for bibliometric rankings has been stressed by Marchant (2009a,b),
Rousseau (2008a) and Waltman and van Eck (2009a,b). Because of the
eld normalization that was used, the \crown indicator" of the Leiden group
failed to satisfy it (see Waltman, van Eck, van Leeuwen, Visser, and van Raan
2010b, who use the word \consistency" instead of \independence"). This has
lead the Leiden group to modify the denition of its crown indicator, using a
dierent eld normalization, so that the new indicator satises Independence
6(for more information on this new indicator, see also Waltman, van Eck, van
Leeuwen, Visser, and van Raan 2010a).
Axiom 4 (Archimedean). For all a;b;c 2 J such that N(a) = N(b) = N(c),
8
<
:
a  b
and
b  c
9
=
;
)
8
<
:
n  a + m  c  (n + m)  b
and
(n0 + m0)  b  n0  a + m0  c
9
=
;
for some n;m;n0;m0 2 N that are strictly positive.
It is easy to check that the above condition is satised by the relation
%IF dened by (1). Indeed, since N(a) = N(c), we have
IF(n  a + m  c) =
nC(a) + mC(c)
nN(a) + mN(c)
=
nC(a) + mC(c)
(n + m)N(a)
=
n
n + m
IF(a) +
m
n + m
IF(c):
Hence, when IF(a) > IF(b) > IF(c), it is clearly possible to nd strictly
positive n;m 2 N such that IF(n  a + m  c) = n
n+mIF(a) + m
n+mIF(c) >
IF((n+m)b) = IF(b). A similar reasoning shows that the other part of the
condition also holds.
This condition is technical and more dicult to interpret than the preced-
ing ones. Take three journals of equal size a;b;c 2 J with b being \between"
a and c in terms of desirability. The condition introduces a new journal
n  a + m  c that consists of n times journal a plus m times journal c. This
new journal \combines" the most preferred journal a with the least preferred
one c. If n is large compared to m, the inuence of the least desirable jour-
nal c in the journal n  a + m  c will be small. Hence, when we compare
it with journal (n + m)  b, i.e., the intermediate journal scaled up to have
the same size as the new journal, we should prefer the new journal. The
interpretation of the other part of the condition is similar. The Archimedean
condition would fail if some journals in J were \innitely desirable", so that
combining them with other ones in whatever manner would always lead to an
innitely desirable journal. Archimedean-like axioms are necessary as soon
as one wishes to obtain a weak order that has a numerical representation
(Krantz et al. 1971), which is clearly the case for %IF dened by (1).
Axiom 5 (Increasingness). For all a;b 2 J such that N(a) = N(b) = 1 and
C(a) > C(b), a  b.
7This condition is a very mild one. It says that when we compare jour-
nals having published a single paper, the one having received more citations
should be preferred. This condition is clearly satised by the relation %IF
dened by (1).
4. Rankings using Generalized Impact Factors
In this section, we consider a family of bibliometric rankings that are
very close to %IF except that the value of a paper having received x citations
is computed using an increasing function u. This leads to what we call
Generalized Impact Factors (GIFs).
4.1. Result
The ve conditions introduced in the preceding section are all that is
needed to characterize relations comparing journals using GIFs.
Theorem 1. A binary relation % on J satises Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 if
and only if (i) there is an increasing real-valued function u on N such that,
for all a;b 2 J,
a % b , GIFu(a) =
P
x2N u(x)a(x)
P
x2N a(x)
 GIFu(b) =
P
x2N u(x)b(x)
P
x2N b(x)
: (2)
The function u is unique up to scale and location, i.e., if there are two increas-
ing real-valued functions u and v on N such that (2) holds, then u = v +,
for some ; 2 R with  > 0.
Going from model (2) to model (1) requires supposing that the function
u is ane, i.e., that, for all x 2 N, u(x) = x +  with ; 2 R and  > 0.
We discuss below the interpretation that can be given to the function u in
model (2).
Theorem 1 shows ve conditions suces to characterize the family of
bibliometric ranking based on GIFs. Let us observe that if someone suggests
to rank order journals using a new bibliometric index that is not a GIFs, the
resulting ranking will necessarily violate at least one the above ve conditions.
This is one possible virtue of this result.
The proof of Theorem 1 exploits the similarity between our problem and
classical results in expected utility theory. We rst use the Homogeneity con-
dition to transform the problem of comparing journals, i.e., functions from N
8to N, into a problem of comparison of probability distributions on N having
a nite support with rational components, i.e., using only probabilities in Q.
We then use a result in Shepherdson (1980) that gives necessary and su-
cient conditions for an expected utility representation of a relation comparing
probability distributions with nite support and rational components.
Proof of Theorem 1. Necessity is easily established. We prove suciency.
Let us associate to each journal a 2 J a probability distribution a with
nite support and rational components on N dening, for all x 2 N,
a(x) =
a(x)
N(a)
;
i.e., a(x) is the proportion of papers published by a 2 J having received x
citations.
Suppose that a;b 2 J are such that a = b. Using the Homogeneity
condition, we know that a  a0 = N(b)  a and b  b0 = N(a)  b. It is clear
that a0(x) = b0(x), for all x 2 N, so that a0 = b0 and, thus, a0  b0. Using the
transitivity of , we therefore conclude that a = b ) a  b.
Let us dene a relation % on the set  of all probability distributions
with nite support and rational components on N, letting, for all p;q 2 ,
p %
 q , [a % b; for all a;b 2 J such that p = a and q = b]:
We claim that, for all a;b 2 J,
a % b , a %
 b:
Indeed, suppose that a % b and that Not[a % b]. This implies that there
are c;d 2 J such that a = c, b = d and Not[c % d]. Because a = c, we
know that a  c. Similarly, b = d implies b  d. Because c  a, a % b, and
b  d, the transitivity of % implies that c % d, a contradiction. Furthermore,
by construction, it is impossible that a % b and that Not[a % b]. This
proves the claim.
Suppose now that the relation % on  satises the following three con-
ditions:
i{ % is complete and transitive,
ii{ for all p;q;r 2 , p  q implies 1
2p+ 1
2r  1
2q + 1
2r and p  q implies
1
2p + 1
2r  1
2q + 1
2r,
9iii{ for all p;q;r 2 , p  q and q  r implies p + (1   )r  q and
q  p + (1   )r, for some ; 2 (0;1) \ Q.
Using Shepherdson (1980, corollary 5.2, p. 106), we know that there is a
real-valued function u on N such that, for all p;q 2 ,
p %
 q ,
X
x2N
p(x)u(x) 
X
x2N
q(x)u(x);
where u is unique up to scale and location.
Hence, we have, for all a;b 2 J,
a % b , a %
 b
,
X
x2N
a(x)u(x) 
X
x2N
b(x)u(x)
,
P
x2N u(x)a(x)
P
x2N a(x)

P
x2N u(x)b(x)
P
x2N b(x)
:
Let us show that, under Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 on %, conditions i, ii, and iii
on % hold.
Observe rst that, for all p 2 , there is an a 2 J such that p = a.
Since we know that a % b , a % b, it is clear that % is complete and
transitive.
Let p;q;r 2 . There are a;b;c 2 J such that a = p, b = q, c = r
and N(a) = N(b) = N(c). Suppose now that p  q, so that a  b. Using
the Independence condition, we know that a+c  b+c. Since it is clear that
a+c = 1
2a+1
2c, we obtain 1
2a+1
2c  1
2b+1
2c, so that 1
2p+1
2r  1
2q+1
2r.
A similar reasoning shows that p  q implies 1
2p + 1
2r  1
2q + 1
2r.
Suppose now that p  q and q  r. There are a;b;c 2 J such that
a = p, b = q, c = r and N(a) = N(b) = N(c). We know that a  b and
b  c. Using the Archimedean condition, we know that there are strictly
positive n;m 2 N such that n  a + m  c  (n + m)  b. Let  = n
n+m. We
have  2 (0;1) \ Q. It is easy to check that na+mc = a + (1   )c and
(n+m)b = b. Hence, we have a +(1 )c  b, for some  2 (0;1)\Q.
The proof of the other part of the condition is entirely similar.
Noting that Axiom 5 clearly implies that u must be increasing completes
the proof.
104.2. Interpretation and uses of GIFs
Computing GIFs involves using an increasing function u. This raises the
problem of the choice and interpretation of this function. We rst examine
the case in which GIFs are used with a single function u. We then consider
using GIFs together with a whole family of functions u.
4.2.1. Attitudes towards dispersion
Consider, e.g., the case of two journals, a;b 2 J. Journal a has published
two hundred papers, each of them being cited once. Journal b has also
published two hundred papers. One hundred of them have never been cited.
The other one hundred have all been cited twice. Comparisons based on
IFs require that two distributions of relative frequencies of citations having
the same mean must be judged indierent. Since IF(a) = IF(b) = 1, it is
impossible to distinguish the above two journals, although they have quite
dierent distributions of citations. This is no more true using GIFs instead
of IFs. Using the function u(x) =
p
x, we obtain GIFu(a) > GIFu(b). Using
the function u(x) = x2, we have GIFu(b) > GIFu(a). Concave functions u
tend to favor distributions of citations that are centered around their mean,
while an opposite eect occurs with convex functions. This should not be a
surprise to readers familiar with expected utility theory (Fishburn 1970, Ch.
8) and the literature on \risk aversion" (Arrow 1965, Pratt 1964). In this
framework, the concavity (resp. convexity) of u models \risk aversion" (resp.
\risk proneness").
Distinguishing several \attitude towards risk" makes perfect sense in de-
cision theory. But is this so in the area of bibliometrics? This paper does
not wish to be a plea for the use of GIFs instead of IFs when comparing
journals. Nevertheless, we think that the extra exibility oered by GIFs
when compared to IFs has much to oer.
Seglen (1997, p. 499) warns us that \Citation rate of article determines
journal impact, but not vice versa". Nevertheless, the past distribution of
citations of papers published in a journal may give some information on the
selection process of papers in this journal and its visibility in the scientic
community. Hence, it may give some information about the future citations
of newly published papers in this journal. The empirical evidence about the
reasonableness of such an hypothesis is mixed. The analysis in Seglen (1994)
would tend to reject it. However, more recent studies lead to the reverse con-
clusion. Vieira and Gomes (2010, p. 10) mention that IFs inuence future
citations. The most impressive evidence in this direction was presented in
11Larivi ere and Gingras (2010) who study the fate of identical papers published
in dierent journals. This shows that IFs may have an inuence on future
citations. We think likely that the inuence of past distributions of citations
on future citations is not only through their means. Their entire shape may
also matter. Notice that this would be in line with the famous Matthew ef-
fect described in Merton (1968). Authors willing to try to take advantage
of the Matthew eect will tend to have a preference for distributions that
are much dispersed around their mean: having one highly cited paper will
attract many future citations and it makes sense to take risks to have one
highly cited papers via a submission policy to journals having an extremely
skewed distribution of citations. Other authors, e.g., because they are anx-
ious to produce a relatively stable prole of citations over time, will tend
to have a preference for distributions that are centered around their means.
Such preferences are easily accounted using GIFs: convex (resp. concave)
functions u will be able to model the preferences of authors having a favor-
able attitude towards dispersion (resp. concentration). More generally, the
literature on risk aversion in expected utility theory can easily be transposed
to our problem of comparing distributions of citations respectively replac-
ing \risk attitudes" by the \attitude towards dispersion". This literature
(Arrow 1965, Pratt 1964) has devised various indices to compare \degrees
of risk aversion" and various remarkable classes of utility functions. It may
therefore be of much help to guide the choice of an adequate function u in
our context.
Observe nally that Axiom 5 can be weakened to cope with nondecreasing
functions u. It suces to modify it stating that, for all a;b 2 J such that
N(a) = N(b) = 1, C(a) > C(b) ) a % b. This modication clearly leaves
the statement of Theorem 1 unchanged except that \increasing" is replaced
by \nondecreasing". In this relaxed setting, GIFs contain as a particular
case indices based on the proportion of \highly cited papers" published by a
journal, where highly cited papers are interpreted as papers having received
at least k 2 N citations, where k is a xed threshold. This is obvious con-
sidering a nondecreasing function u that is stepped, i.e., u(x) = 0, for all
x < k and u(x) = 1, for all x  k. As pointed out to us by a referee, indices
based of the proportion of highly cited papers deserve attention since they
are frequently used. This is particularly true if k is taken to be 1: in this case,
the proportion of \highly cited papers" becomes one minus the proportion
of uncited papers.
124.2.2. Stochastic dominance
Bibliometric distributions are highly skewed (Seglen 1992) and the dis-
tribution of citations to papers published in a journal are no exception (van
Leeuwen and Moed 2005). However, there is no universal agreement in the
bibliometric literature concerning the type of distributions that is prevalent
(see, e.g., Bar-Ilan 2008, sect. 4.1 and Vieira and Gomes 2010, p. 2. One
may also compare Egghe 2005, Seglen 1992, and van Raan 2001). Indeed,
the data presented in Appendix A show that, for similar journals in the same
eld, rather dierent distributions can be observed. Comparing such diverse
distributions taking only their mean into account may involve a huge loss of
information. Hence, it may be wise to look for more robust ways to compare
them. GIFs oer a simple way to do so, via the idea of stochastic dominance
(the potential interest of this concept for bibliometrics was already stressed in
Carayol and Lahatte 2009 and Waltman and van Eck 2009b). The underly-
ing idea is quite simple. Instead of comparing journals using GIFs computed
using a single function u (as is implicitly the case when using IFs), we might
look for comparisons that are valid for a much larger set of functions u. Let
us illustrate how such comparisons are performed using rst and second order
stochastic dominance (Fishburn and Vickson 1978, Levy 1992, 1998).
Let, for all x 2 N,
F
(1)
a (x) =
x X
i=0
a(i);
i.e., F
(1)
a (x) is the proportion of papers published in journal a having received
at most x citations. First order stochastic dominance corresponds to the case
in which F
(1)
a (x)  F
(1)
b (x), for all x 2 N. Intuitively, the proportion of paper
having less than x citations is greater for journal b than for journal a, for
all x. In such a case, we know that GIFu(a)  GIFu(b), for all increasing
functions u on N (Fishburn and Vickson 1978).
Similarly dening, for all x 2 N,
F
(2)
a (x) =
x X
i=0
F
(1)(i);
second order stochastic dominance corresponds to the case in which F
(2)
a (x) 
F
(2)
b (x), for all x 2 N. When this happens, we know that GIFu(a)  GIFu(b),
for all increasing and concave functions u on N (Fishburn and Vickson 1978).
13The intuition behind this property is related to the fact that when two jour-
nals have the same IF, if F
(2)
a (x)  F
(2)
b (x), for all x 2 N, then one can
go from a to b through a series of \mean-preserving spreads" (Rothschild
and Stiglitz 1970), i.e., transformations that increase the dispersion of the
distribution around its mean.
Using the idea of stochastic dominance leads to robust journal compar-
isons based on bibliometric data. Doing so, we may however end up with
many journals that remain incomparable. The results presented in Ap-
pendix A nevertheless show that these robust comparisons are not as in-
complete as could have been expected.
4.3. Independence of the axioms in Theorem 1
The following ve examples show that none of the conditions used in
Theorem 1 is redundant.
Example 1 (Not Axiom 1). Let %1 and %2 be two binary relations on J
satisfying the conditions of Theorem 1. Dene the relation % = %1 \ %2. It
is easy to check that % satises Axioms 2, 3, 4, and 5. It violates Axiom 1
as soon as there are a;b 2 J such that a 1 b and b 2 a, since, in this case,
the relation % is not complete.
Example 2 (Not Axiom 2). Dene the relation % on J letting, for all a;b 2 J,
a % b , C(a)  C(b);
i.e., a ranking based on the number of citations received. It is easy to check
that Axioms 1, 3, 4 and 5 are satised. Axiom 2 is clearly violated.
Example 3 (Not Axiom 3). Let u and v be two increasing real-valued func-
tions on N, with v > 0, that are not related by a positive ane transforma-
tion. Dene the relation % on J letting, for all a;b 2 J
a % b ,
GIFu(a)
GIFv(a)

GIFu(b)
GIFv(b)
:
It is easy to check that Axioms 1, 2, 4, and 5 are satised. Axiom 3 is violated
(Fishburn 1988, page 62).
Example 4 (Not Axiom 4). Let u and v be two increasing real-valued func-
tions on N that are not related by a positive ane transformation. Dene
the relation % on J letting, for all a;b 2 J
a % b , [GIFu(a);GIFv(a)] 
L [GIFu(b);GIFv(b)];
14where L is the lexicographic order on R2. It is easy to check that Axioms
1, 2, 3, and 5 are satised. Axiom 4 is violated. Indeed, suppose that
GIFu(a) = GIFu(b) > GIFu(c) and GIFv(a) > GIFv(b) > GIFv(c). We have
a  b and b  c. But we have (n + m)  b  n  a + m  c, for all strictly
positive n;m 2 N.
Example 5 (Not Axiom 5). Let u be a decreasing real-valued function on
N. Dene % on J through (2). Axioms 1, 2, 3, and 4 are clearly satised.
Axiom 5 is violated by construction.
5. Ranking using Impact Factors
This section investigates what must be added to the conditions used in
Theorem 1 to guarantee that the function u becomes an ane function,
implying that model (2) reduces to model (1).
Consider a journal a 2 J. Suppose that a paper published in a receives
an additional citation. When journals are compared using IFs, it does not
matter which of the papers published in a receives the additional citation.
An additional citation to any paper published in a will increase IF(a) by
1=N(a). This is characteristic of the ranking of journals using IFs. Since our
framework is static, it is not exible enough to analyze the case of a journal
receiving an additional citation, we will consider dierent journals in J that
will allow for such an interpretation.
Let a 2 J. Let I(a) = fx 2 N : a(x) 6= 0g, i.e., I(a) is a set of integers
x such that a has papers having been cited x times. For each x 2 I(a), we
can build a distribution corresponding to a journal a"x that is identical to
that of a except that a paper published by a that was cited x times has now
received an additional citation. More precisely we have a"x(y) = a(y), for all
y 2 N nfx;x +1g, a"x(x) = a(x)   1 and a"x(x +1) = a(x +1)+1. Clearly,
for all x 2 I(a), the journal a"x has the same number of papers as a and has
one additional citation.
The next condition says that all journals built in this way should be
indierent, i.e., an additional citation has always the same impact whatever
the paper that receives it.
Axiom 6 (Equal Impact of Additional Citations). For all a 2 J and for all
x;y 2 I(a), a"x  a"y
15It is clear this additional condition is satised by the ranking dened by
(1). When added to the conditions used in Theorem 1, it implies that u on
N is ane so that models (2) and (1) coincide.
Theorem 2. A binary relation % on J satises Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
i, for all a;b 2 J,
a % b , IF(a)  IF(b):
Proof. Necessity is clear. We show suciency. Using Theorem 1, we know
that there is an increasing real-valued function u on N such that, for all
a;b 2 J,
a % b , GIFu(a)  GIFu(b):
Let x 2 N. Consider the journal ax 2 J such that such that, for all y 2 N,
ax(y) = 0 except that ax(x) = 1 and ax(x+1) = 1. Hence the journal ax has
two papers: one with x citations and the other with x + 1 citations. Let us
apply Axiom 6 to ax, implying that the following two journals are indierent.
The rst journal, a"x
x , has two papers, each one with x + 1 citations. The
second journal, a"x+1
x , has two papers, the rst one having x citations and
the second having x + 2 citations. This implies that the function u must be
such that:
1
2
u(x + 1) +
1
2
u(x + 1) = u(x + 1) =
1
2
u(x) +
1
2
u(x + 2):
Because this relation must hold for all x 2 N, it is clear that u must be ane
in x. Because we know that u is increasing, it must be such that u(x) = x+
with ; 2 R and  > 0. This completes the proof since ranking journals
using such a function u is clearly equivalent to ranking journals according to
their IFs.
If someone suggests to rank order journals using a new bibliometric index
that is not the IF and that uses the same information as in our model, we
know that at least one of the six conditions used in Theorem 2 will be violated.
A person willing to completely rank order journals will surely agree the Weak
order condition. It is hard to imagine that someone could disagree with
Increasingness in the context of ranking journals on the basis of bibliometric
data. Moreover, we think that the need to use a size-independent index for
comparing journals, as modelled by Homogeneity, is rather uncontroversial.
Hence, if it is admitted that the Archimedean condition is mainly technical,
16the use of IFs seems to rest on the combined use of Independence and Equal
Impact of Additional Citations.
The independence of the conditions used in Theorem 2 raises subtle ques-
tions. Since this is not central for our purpose, we will not detail this point
here.
6. Discussion
This paper has analyzed the ranking of journals based on IFs using an
axiomatic approach. We have given necessary and sucient conditions (The-
orem 2) for a binary relation comparing journals to coincide with the relation
induced by IFs. We have also analyzed a general class of indices, called Gen-
eralized Impact Factors (GIFs), in which distributions of citations having
equal means are not necessarily considered as indierent (Theorem 1). This
family of indices uses a function u that allows to capture various attitudes
towards the dispersion of citations, as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function allows to capture several attitudes towards risk.
The axiomatic approach followed in this paper aims at characterizing a
bibliometric ranking of journals by the conjunction of a small number of con-
ditions. When these conditions have a clear intuitive content, we think that
such an analysis may enlighten the discussion concerning the pros and cons of
a bibliometric ranking. Indeed, discussions centered around axioms are often
more precise than discussions based on the \intuitive reasonableness" of an
index. A central condition in the characterization of the class of bibliometric
rankings based on GIFs is Independence. This condition says that if two
journals a and b of equal size both merge with a third journal c having the
same size, the merger should not alter the comparison of a and b. Although
this condition might sometimes be seen as being too strong (see Section 3),
it appears reasonable in many cases. Yet, as observed by Marchant (2009a),
Rousseau (2008a), and Waltman and van Eck (2009b), it is violated by the
bibliometric ranking based on the h-index (Hirsch 2005) (the same is true for
most bibliometric rankings based on variants of the h-index, see Waltman
and van Eck 2009b). This gives a precise basis for comparing rankings based
on GIFs with the ones based on the h-index or its variants. Our hope is
that axiomatic analyses of the type exposed here, combined with systematic
empirical studies of indices, will give a sound basis to compare and evaluate
bibliometric rankings.
17We would like to conclude with the mention of a few directions for fu-
ture research and the indication of a number of important limitations of the
present study.
Once it is recognized that the problem of comparing distributions of cita-
tions is very similar to the problem of comparing probability distributions, it
is clear that any model used in decision making under risk can be transposed
to the case of comparing journals, if Homogeneity is admitted. Some of these
models are quite subtle, involving consistent violations of the Independence
condition (see Gilboa 2009, Schmidt 2004, Sugden 2004, Wakker 2010, for
overviews). In particular models stemming from Expected Utility with Rank
Dependent Probabilities can oer interesting approaches to cope with outliers
in the distribution of citations. This will be the subject of future research.
Although importing models for decision making under risk in the area of
bibliometrics may give rise to new and interesting concepts, such a trans-
position also raises problems and questions. In decision making under risk,
we model the preferences of a decision maker having to make a choice be-
tween risky prospects. The model wishes to be a useful guide to elicit her
preferences and to help her choose. No such decision maker is present in
bibliometrics. What is sought here are \indices" leading to rankings that
would make sense to several persons (authors, editors, publishers, evaluators,
etc) having potentially dierent perceptions and preferences. This seems to
call for much caution in the above transposition. For instance, the weak
order condition is almost universally accepted in decision theory (see Fish-
burn 1991, however). Its reasonableness is far less obvious when it comes to
compare journals (Adler et al. 2009).
Another important limitation of our study is the static and rather rough
character of our framework. It clearly does not allow to analyze the, often
sweeping, consequences of publicizing a measure of impact of journals on
the behavior of authors, editors, publishers or evaluators. It is clear that
the use of IFs has had consequences on academia that go far beyond the
formal properties of the ranking that it induces on journals (Adler et al.
2009, Monastersky 2005, Seglen 1997, Weingart 2005). These consequences
are an essential part of the \Impact Factor debate" evoked in Bar-Ilan (2008,
p. 22) and are left untouched by the analysis presented here.
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23A. Citation data for some economic journals
We have studied citation data for eight economic journals: American
Economic Review (AER), Econometrica (Eca), Journal of Economic Liter-
ature (JEL), Journal of Economic Perspectives (JEP), Journal of Financial
Economics (JFE), Journal of Political Economy (JPE), Quarterly Journal of
Economics (QJE), Review of Economic Studies (RES). These eight journals
all have high IFs in the 2008 edition of the JCR (Thomson Reuters 2009a).
AER, Eca, JPE, QJE and RES are often considered as \top journals" in Eco-
nomics. They publish papers in all areas in Economics. JFE is a renowned
but more specialized journal. JEL and JEP publish mainly \review" articles.
We have based our analysis on citations extracted from Thomson Reuters
(2009b) (as in van Leeuwen and Moed 2005). For each journal, we have
decided to select only documents of the \article" and \review" types (as
given by Thomson Reuters 2009b) and published in 2006{2007 2. Table 1
gives, for each of the 8 journals, the number of citations received in 2008
by the \article" and \review" items published in 2006{2007. Dividing this
number by the number of \article" and \review" items gives \our" 2008
Impact Factor for these journals. Table 2 and Figure 1 give, for each of the
8 journals, the number of items having received x citations.
We would like to emphasize three main points.
1. Figure 1 reveals that all distributions of citations are highly skewed,
as was expected (Seglen 1992). Although we are dealing with similar
journals in the same eld, all distributions do not have the same shape:
QJE and Eca have distributions that are much less skewed than the
other ones in our sample, while the distribution for JEL seems to be
very particular. Only taking the mean of these distribution of citations
into account to compare journals may involve a huge loss of information.
GIFs oer a simple mean to take more information into account.
2. The idea of stochastic dominance, i.e., using of GIFs with several func-
tions u, leads to comparisons that are not as incomplete as could have
been expected. As is easily checked, Table 2 contains several cases of
rst order stochastic dominance between journals: QJE, Eca, JEP, and
2 The exclusion of \proceedings papers" was mainly motivated by the inclusion of AER
in our sample. This journal publishes \proceedings issues" that are rather dierent from
its normal issues
24JFE dominate RES. More cases of second order of stochastic dominance
occur. QJE dominates Eca, JEL, JEP, JFE, JPE, AER, and RES. Eca
dominates JEL, JEP, JFE, JPE, AER, and RES. JEP, JFE, JPE, and
AER dominate RES. These comparisons are valid for all rankings based
on GIFs using an increasing and concave function u. It is interesting to
notice that JEL does not rst or second order stochastically dominate
RES although the dierence in their IFs is large and several journals
with lower IFs than JEL second order stochastically dominate RES.
Again, this is due to the very particular distribution of citations for
JEL. Using the mean of this distribution to compare JEL with other
journals may not lead to very robust comparisons.
3. Journals having close IFs can be compared dierently when using GIFs
with dierent functions u. For instance the IF of JEP is 3.420 while
the IF of JFE is 3.394. These two journals are not related by rst
or second order stochastic dominance. Using GIFs together with a
function u that is close to being ane will therefore lead to prefer
JEP to JFE. Introducing more aversion to dispersed distributions of
citations, may reverse this comparison. Consider the family of CARA
(Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) utility functions (Arrow 1965, Pratt
1964) for which we have u(x) =  e x with  > 0. When  = 0:03, it
can be checked that JFE becomes preferable to JEP.
Journals # items published
in 2006{2007
# of citations
received in 2008
IF
QJE 83 367 4:422
Eca 100 386 3:860
JEL 37 135 3:649
JEP 88 301 3:420
JFE 175 594 3:394
JPE 69 227 3:290
AER 191 577 3:021
RES 90 226 2:511
Table 1: Data for some economic journals. Source: Thomson Reuters (2009a,b). Items
in analysis are of the \article" and \review" types published in 2006 and 2007. Note:
Extraction performed 1 December 2009.
25QJE Eca JEL JEP JFE JPE AER RES
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % # %
0 2 0.024 15 0.150 16 0.432 18 0.205 43 0.246 16 0.232 40 0.209 27 0.300
1 13 0.157 12 0.120 5 0.135 20 0.227 33 0.189 16 0.232 51 0.267 13 0.144
2 14 0.169 21 0.210 2 0.054 16 0.182 21 0.120 8 0.116 25 0.131 19 0.211
3 18 0.217 11 0.110 1 0.027 11 0.125 25 0.143 6 0.087 18 0.094 9 0.100
4 9 0.108 11 0.110 3 0.081 4 0.045 5 0.029 6 0.087 13 0.068 6 0.067
5 4 0.048 8 0.080 0 0.000 4 0.045 13 0.074 3 0.043 12 0.063 2 0.022
6 2 0.024 6 0.060 3 0.081 2 0.023 8 0.046 2 0.029 9 0.047 4 0.044
7 7 0.084 2 0.020 1 0.027 3 0.034 7 0.040 3 0.043 6 0.031 1 0.011
8 2 0.024 3 0.030 1 0.027 0 0.000 3 0.017 1 0.014 2 0.010 3 0.033
9 2 0.024 1 0.010 0 0.000 0 0.000 4 0.023 1 0.014 2 0.010 3 0.033
10 3 0.036 1 0.010 2 0.054 3 0.034 4 0.023 2 0.029 1 0.005 2 0.022
11 0 0.000 2 0.020 1 0.027 1 0.011 1 0.006 1 0.014 1 0.005 0 0.000
12 4 0.048 3 0.030 0 0.000 1 0.011 0 0.000 1 0.014 5 0.026 1 0.011
13 2 0.024 2 0.020 0 0.000 1 0.011 1 0.006 0 0.000 1 0.005 0 0.000
14 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 2 0.011 1 0.014 2 0.010 0 0.000
15 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.011 0 0.000 1 0.014 1 0.005 0 0.000
16 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.014 1 0.005 0 0.000
17 1 0.012 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
18 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.011 2 0.011 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
19 0 0.000 2 0.020 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.006 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
20 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
21 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.006 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
22 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.011 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
23 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.027 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
24 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.027 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
25 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
26 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.011 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
27 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.005 0 0.000
28 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
29 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
30 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
31 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
32 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
33 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
34 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.006 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
35 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
83 1.000 100 1.000 37 1.000 88 1.000 175 1.000 69 1.000 191 1.000 90 1.000
Table 2: Distribution of citations. Source: Thomson Reuters (2009b). For each journal,
the column \#" gives the number of items published in 2006{2007 having received the
corresponding number of citations in 2008. The column \%" gives the corresponding
proportion.
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Figure 1: Distribution of citations for some economic journals. Source: Table 2. Note:
The scale of both axes is identical for each journal: 0 to 35 (citations) on the horizontal
axis, 0.00 to 0.50 (proportion of papers) on the vertical axis.
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